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CLIFFORD DOCTRINE
THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS EXAMINE
THE CLIFFORD DOCTRINE
By RICHARD W. CASE*
On February 26, 1940, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided the case of Helvering v. Clifford.' In the
relatively short period of time which has elapsed since
that decision was handed down, the doctrine of the Clifford
case has been the subject of controversy in more than
forty appeals to the various Circuit Courts of Appeals.
Although the Clifford doctrine has provided a source for
countless articles in leading law reviews and tax maga-
zines,2 it is believed that its frequent appearance in the Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals justifies an analysis of their deci-
sions.' This is very clearly demonstrated when it is con-
sidered that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1941, LL.B., 1942, University of
Maryland. Lecturer on Equity Pleading and Taxation, University of
Maryland School of Law.I Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).2 Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Section 22 (a) (1941) 51 Yale L. J.
213; Reidick, The Problem of Personal Income Tax Avoidance (1940) 7
Law and Cont. Prob. 243; Surrey, The Supreme Court and The Federal
Income Tax (1941) 35 Il. L. Rev. 779, 795; Warren, Liability of Settlors of
Irrevocable Short Term Trusts (1940) 38 Mich. L. Rev. 885; Magill, The
Federal Income Tax on The Family (1941) 20 Tex. L. Rev. 150, 156-158;
Ray, The Income Tax on Short Term and Revocable Trusts (1940) 53 Harv.
L. Rev. 1322; Jones, Family Trusts and Federal Taxes (1942) 9 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 427; Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem (1941) 54 Harv.
L. Rev., 398, 421-422; Altman, Community Property in Peril (1941) 19 Tax
Mag. 262; Nash, What Law Taxation (1940) 9 Ford. L. Rev. 165; Tyre,
Federal Taxation of Irrevocable Trusts Reexamined (1940) 18 Tax Mag.
216; Magill, The Supreme Court on Federal Taxation, 1939-40 (1940) 8 U.
of Chi. L. Rev. 1; Nash, Implications of Some Recent Developments in the
Taxation of Trusts (1940) 18 Tax Mag. 267; see also 6 MEHTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1942) Sees. 37.17, 371. See also Merrills,
Status of short term trusts and trusts where the control remains in the
grantor under the Federal income tax (1943) 28 Wash. U. L. Q. 99, pub-
lished as this was being set in type.
I This fact was foreshadowed by Ray, The Income Tax on Short Term
and Revocable Trusts (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1322, 1352-1353, where the
author said:
"An attempt to formulate by deduction rules as to the extent to
which the grantor may exercise control over corpus without sub-
jecting himself to tax makes evident the fact that these questions
arising from the Clifford case are questions of degree and will not be
answered until enough cases have been decided to prick out the line
between situations in which the grantor is taxable and those in
which he is not."
See also Nash, Implications of Some Recent Developments in the Taxation
of Trusts (1940) 18 Tax Mag. 267, 331.
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only five of the forty odd cases which have dealt with the
doctrine before the Circuit Courts. It becomes obvious,
therefore, that for the greater part, the boundaries and lim-
its of the Clifford doctrine lie in the hands of the lower
Federal Courts, and particularly in the hands of the Circuit
Courts of Appeals.4
I
THE CLIFFORD CASE RE-EXAMINED
In Helvering v. Clifford the taxpayer created a trust,
naming himself as trustee and his wife as beneficiary.
The trust was to last for five years, or for a shorter time
if either the grantor or his wife died. The indenture pro-
vided that upon termination, the settlor was to receive
the trust corpus, and further provided that any accumu-
lated income was to be paid to the beneficiary. During
the life of the trust the trustee had full power to manage
the property by voting the securities which constituted
the res, to sell, exchange, or in any way encumber the
corpus or accumulated income, and to invest any funds
constituting "trust funds" by making unsecured loans, de-
posits in banks, or by buying securities without regard
for their "speculative character" or their "rate of return".
The settlor also retained the power to collect all income,
to compromise any claims held by him as trustee, and to
hold any property in the trust estate in any name, including
his own as an individual.
The question presented was whether or not the income
from the trust was taxable to the settlor. Basing its opin-
ion on the broad sweep of Section 22 (a) of the Internal
4 In so stating, the author is well aware of the abundance of authority
dealing with the Clifford doctrine available in the reported decisions of
The Tax Court of the United States (formerly the Board of Tax Appeals).
These cases are omitted from the present article not because it is felt that
they are any less important to the tax practitioner than the decisions of
the Circuit Courts of Appeals, but because the length of this paper coupled
with its attempt to present a general view of the problem necessitates the
narrowing of its scope. For a similar reason, all future references to
decisions of the District Courts of the United States will be confined to the
footnotes. For an excellent analysis of some of the leading decisions of
The Tax Court and the District Courts see Pavenstedt, op. cit. n. 2.
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Revenue Code,5 the Supreme Court held that the head
of a family could not avoid tax liability by channelling a
portion of his income to members of his immediate family
by means of a short-term trust, over which he retained
such a degree of control as to constitute him, for all prac-
tical purposes, the owner of the corpus.
Utilization of the trust device as a means of tax avoid-
ance was by no means new before the Clifford case was
decided.6 A constant battle had been waged between Con-
gress and the taxpayer with respect to Sections 166 and
167 of the Internal Revenue Code.7 It was clear, however,
5 For purposes of discussion of the Clifford doctrine, Section 22 (a) is
as follows:
"See. 22 (a). General Definition-'Gross income' includes gains,
profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation
for personal service, . . . of whatever kind and in whatever form
paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce,
or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal growing
out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also
from interest, rents, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any
business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income
derived from any source whatever . . ."
6 For a more complete discussion of this point, see Warren, Liability of
Settlors of Irrevocable Short Term Trusts (1940) 38 Mich. L. Rev. 885, in
which the author states in part:
"It is easily understood why the history of the taxation of trust
income has been described as an unending struggle between tax-
payers and the government. Taxpayers and their counsel are con-
tinually seeking devices which, while permitting escape from sur-
taxes, will yet allow the settlor maximum control over the trust
property. The treasury department, on the other hand, in seeking
to close all avenues of escape, believes it proper to tax settlors who
retain control over and receive the benefits from trust property."
Also see Reidick, The Problem of Personal Income Tax Avoidance (1940)
7 Law and Cont. Prob. 243, 251; Warren, The Reduction of Income Taxes
Through the Use of Trusts (1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 809; Buck, Income Tax
Evasion and Avoidance (1936-37) 23 Va. L. Rev. 107, 265.
SEC. 166. REVOCABLE TRuSTS.
Where at any time the power to revest in the grantor title to any
part of the corpus of the trust is vested-
(1) in the grantor, either alone or in conjunction with any person
not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such
part of the corpus or the income therefrom, or
(2) in any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the
disposition of such part of the corpus or the income therefrom,
then the income of such part of the trust shall be included in com-
puting the net income of the grantor.
SEC. 167. INCOME FOR BENEFIT OF GRANTOR.
(a) Where any part of the income of a trust-
(1) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not
having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part
of the income may be, .held or accumulated for future distribution
to the grantor; or
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that these sections did not contain the necessary sweep
to place the income of an irrevocable short-term trust in
the settlor's return.' As a result, taxpayers in the high
surtax bracket seized upon the apparently tax immuned
device of a short-term trust as a means by which their
income might be split between the settlor on the one hand
and the beneficiary on the other. When such a device was
utilized it was believed that surtaxes would be substan-
tially reduced. To block this avenue of tax avoidance,
the Supreme Court decided that a taxpayer retaining the
economic benefits of property would remain taxable on
the income derived therefrom, irrespective of the fact that
he had tentatively parted with title thereto by means of
a conveyance in trust to last for a limited time.
An analysis of the Clifford decision shows that in that
case no one fact was regarded as decisive by the Court in
reaching its final conclusion. Important factors which
were considered included the length of the term of the
trust, the control retained by the settlor over the corpus,
the identity of beneficiaries, and the identity of the trustee.
Although a court, in dealing with problems involving the
Clifford doctrine, might treat one factor as controlling, such
a treatment would not necessarily mean that error had
been committed. On the other hand, errors are more likely
to occur if the court utilizes one of the tests outlined by
Mr. Justice Douglas in the Clifford case to the exclusion
of all others. It is submitted, therefore, that the only true
test which can be applied in such cases is whether or not
the settlor, after the creation of the trust, has retained
the economic benefits thereof in such a degree that he will
(2) may, in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not
having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part
of the income, be distributed to the grantor; or
(3) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not
having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part
of the income may be, applied to the payment of premiums upon
policies of insurance on the life of the grantor (except policies of
insurance irrevocably payable for the purposes and in the manner
specified in section 23 (o), relating to the so-called "charitable con-
tribution" deduction) ;
then such part of the income of the trust shall be included in com-
puting the net income of the grantor.
8 Helvering v. Wood, 309 U. S. 344 (1940).
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continue to realize economic gain from the corpus. It
follows that the factors outlined in the Clifford decision
are not complete tests in themselves, but are only aids
in arriving at the ultimate decision, and should not, there-
fore, be considered as isolated criteria.
After the Clifford case had been decided, a controversy
arose concerning the utility of such a nebulous kind of
decision. On the one hand it was contended that the
sweeping language used by Mr. Justice Douglas decided
nothing for the future, and that in all fairness to the
taxpayer the Court should have indicated how far it would
go in extending the scope of Section 22 (a).' These conten-
tions were answered on the other hand with the argument
that it was for Congress and not the courts to place exact
limitations on the governmental taxing powers, and that
so long as Section 22 (a) was used to tax income to the set-
tlor of a short-term trust, vagueness was a virtue and not
a vice.10 While it is undoubtedly true that cases involving
the Clifford doctrine should not be dogmatically character-
ized, it is now possible to view with some clarity the
limits of the doctrine, and the reasons for those limitations,
thereby answering, in part, the controversy in question.
As indicated above, this development has been made pos-
sible to a great extent by reason of the fact that numerous
cases involving similar or related questions as found in
Helvering v. Clifford have reached the Circuit Courts of
Appeals within the past three years.
II
SHORT-TERM TRUSTS
The trusts which have been involved in cases before
the Circuit Courts of Appeals construing the Clifford doc-
trine may, for the purpose of clarity, be broken down
into three rough categories. The first group includes those
trusts which can be styled "short-term" family trusts, and
I See Ray, The Income Taw on Short Term and Revocable Trusts (1940)
53 Harv. L. Rev. 1322, 1358, in which the author advocates the passage of
appropriate legislation to cure the defect.
20 Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Section 22 (a) (1941) 51 Yale
L. J. 213, 217-219.
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which usually end after the expiration of six years or
less. In the second class are found trusts which may be
called "trusts of intermediate duration". These are in-
struments which create a relationship to last longer than
the strictly short-term family trust described above, and
yet are not trusts whose termination depends upon the
death of either the settlor or a beneficiary. The third
category are those trusts whose terms are measured by
the life of a party in interest.
As a general proposition, all cases which involve strictly
short-term family trusts have held that income therefrom
should be taxed to the settlor. This rule has been adopted
by statute in England,1 and has now been made universal
in this country by court decision. 2 At first blush, it would
seem that such a rule is at complete variance with geneial
proposition that no one factor should prove conclusive in
applying the Clifford doctrine. An analysis of the reasons
underlying the rule clearly demonstrates, however, that
such is not the case.
A significant reason why income from a short-term
family trust is taxed to the grantor lies in the fact that
the terms of such trusts are for the most part subject to
a close comparison with the terms of the trust in Helvering
v. Clifford. In such cases, the Clifford decision is easy to
follow and the rule of law therein set forth can be applied
with little or no independent trail blazing on the part of
the lower court.13 As was said in Commissioner v. Bar-
bour:14
11 The English tax income of a trust to the settlor If it is to last but for
six years unless the disposition was made for valuable and sufficient con-
sideration. See the Finance Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. V, C. 17, No. 20 (1)
(b).1 2 The Treasury in hearings before the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee on the Revenue Act of 1934 made, among others, the recommenda-
tion that Section 166 be amended to tax the income of a short term trust
to its grantor. The recommendation stated:
"The Income from short-term trusts and trusts which are revoca-
ble by the creator at the expiration of a short period after notice by
him should be made taxable to the creator of the trust."
See Hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., p. 151. Congress did not, however, incorporate such an amend-
ment Into the law.
" See Reuter v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. of Cls., 1940).
1' Commissioner v. Barbour, 122 F. 2d 165 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) Cert. den.
314 U. S. 691 (1941).
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"Accordingly the period of 6 years and 16 days (which
is the longest period involved here) seems close
enough to the five years in Helvering v. Clifford to
bring the present case within its intention."'5
A second reason why income from a short-term family
trust is taxed to the settlor, and perhaps a more important
reason from a theoretical standpoint than the first, is the
fact that irrespective of the creation of such instruments,
a very considerable degree of control over the corpus is
retained by the settlor. Where property is conveyed to
a trustee in trust for a beneficiary and trustee and bene-
ficiary are both members of the settlor's intimate family
group, and where the trust in question is to last for a
relatively short period of time, the settlor has retained in
deeds if not by words dominion and control over the
corpus. He can be relatively sure that there will be no
dissipation of the corpus by the trustee or beneficiary dur-
ing the period of the trust, the reason being that the
settlor has, for all practical purposes, dominion and control
over the trustee and beneficiaries individually. This,
coupled with the fact that the settlor will soon again be
the absolute owner of the res, makes his degree of control
complete. A: summation of this factor was made by Judge
Learned Hand in the following manner in the case of
Helvering v. Elias:16
"A trustee who must manage a fund throughout the
life of the beneficiary may well refuse to be guided
by the counsels of the reversioner; the income is to be
the beneficiary's presumably for a long time, and the
reversioner has a corresponding smaller stake. But
a trustee who will have to account to his beneficiary
for only five or six years and then to the reversioner,
is in a very different position; if he is reasonable, he
will heed the reversioner, treat his interest as para-
mount and be guided by his judgment. Legal powers
of management add very little to such a reversioner's
actual control over the fund while the trust lasts.
For this reason it appears to us that it is only when
15 Supra, n. 14, 166.
18 Helvering v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171, 173 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) Cert. den.
314 U. S. 692 (1941).
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the term is longer than six or seven years (as for
example ten years, Commissioner v. Jonas, 2 Cir., 122
F. 2d 169) that the settlor's legal reservation of con-
trol becomes vital, certainly if the settlor and the
trustee are not strangers."
In stressing the fact that a family trust naming the
settlor's son as beneficiary was to last for only two years,
the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit had
no trouble in following the Clifford doctrine and taxing
the income therefrom to the settlor.17  This decision was
reached in face of the fact that for the two-year period,
the settlor retained no expressed power to control the
corpus. It has uniformly been held that the income from
a family trust which is to last for only three years is tax-
able to the settlor. The Clifford doctrine has been followed
in such cases where the beneficiaries were the settlor and
his wife as guardian for his children,18 the settlor's wife
individually, 9 the settlor's brother, a widow of his de-
ceased brother and his sister,20 and the settlor's nephew.2'
In these decisions little weight was given to the fact that
the trustees happened to be a business associate of the
settlor22 or the settlor in conjunction with a third party
not a member of the intimate family group.23
Before the Clifford case was decided it was a common
practice to make short-term family trusts expire at the
end of five years. As indicated above, the Circuit Courts
have had little trouble in taxing the income of these trusts
to their grantors.24 Unlike cases involving trusts which
17 Commissioner v. Wilson, 125 F. (2d) 307 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
18 Helvering v. Hormel, 111 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940), Reversed:
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941).
'9 McKnight v. Commissioner, 123 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
20 Bush v. Commissioner, 123 F. (2d) 242 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941); First
National Bank of Chicago v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 7th,
1940).
21 Commissioner v. Woolley, 122 F. (2d) 167 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) Cert. den.
314 U. S. 693 (1941).
22 McKnight v. Commissioner, 123 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
23 Helvering v. Hormal, 111 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940), Reversed:
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941).
24 Reuter v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 698 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) ; Com-
missioner v. Goulder, 123 F. (2d) 686 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) ; Thomson
v. Helvering, 114 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940); Penn v. Commis-
sioner, 109 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940); Helvering v. Abraham, 115
F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ; also see supra, n. 13.
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would terminate at the end of three years, however, the
cases involving trusts which terminated at the end of five
years usually vest a measure of expressed control in the
settlor.25  This added factor makes the result of these de-
cisions inevitable.26
In dealing with the taxability of a short-term family
trust, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reached an interesting result in Helvering v. Dunning.
27
In that case the settlor created a family trust which was
irrevocable for five years, but which could be terminated
by the settlor at the end of this period by giving written
notice to the trustee. If no such notice were given, the
trust was to continue for another five years, but if the
settlor died during any of the five-year periods, the trusts
were to continue for twenty-one years after the death of
the last beneficiary. The Court, passing the Clifford doc-
trine, rested its decision on the grounds that the settlor
retained a vested right to revoke the trust which was sub-
ject to being divested, and that as a result, the trust fell
squarely within the letter of Section 166 of the Internal
Revenue Code. It is submitted, however, that the same
result could have been reached on a sounder basis had
the Court seen fit to rely on the Clifford rule.28
25 Commissioner v. Goulder, 123 F. (2d) 686 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) ; Penn
v. Commissioner, 109 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940); Reuter v. United
States, 34 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. of Cls., 1940).
28 See also Commissioner v. Ward, 119 F. (2d) 207 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941),
in which the Court remanded the case to the Board of Tax Appeals for a
rehearing in the light of the Clifford case. There, the trust as originally
framed was to last for five years, but was subsequently amended to last
for six. A trust company was designated as trustee, and the beneficiaries
were the settlor's wife and children. The donor had the power to approve
or disapprove of any and all investments made by the trustee, and had the
power to direct the trustee in making investments, etc. In Reuter v.
United States, 34 F. Supp. 1014 (Ct. of Cls., 1940) a settlor was held taxable
on the income of a trust which was to last five years, which named the
settlor as trustee and his wife, father and mother as beneficiaries, and
which vested brQad and almost unlimited powers upon the trustee to deal
with the trust property upon such terms and conditions as he deemed best.
The Court stated that for all practical purposes the trust was identical
with the one found in the Clifford case.
27 Helvering v. Dunning, 118 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941), Cert. den.
314 U. S. 631 (1941).
28 Under the decided cases it would appear clear that the income from
the trust in the Dunning case should be taxable to the settlor under Sec-
tion 22 (a). It will be noticed that the trust was a "short-term family
trust," and this factor coupled with the broad powers of administrative
control retained by the settlor over the corpus should have been decisive.
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Although dodged in one case,29 the Circuit Courts have
held that income from a family trust which was to last
for six years was taxable to the settlor.30 As indicated
above, the Second Circuit gave little concern in such a
case to the fact that the settlor had parted with his ex-
pressed control over the corpus, 1 and in a similar decision,
the Sixth Circuit did not feel precluded from taxing the
income to the settlor because he had named an independent
trust company as trustee.2 In Commissioner v. Barbour,"
the settlor created two trusts, neither of which could last
longer than six years, six months. The settlor's attorneys
were named trustees, his mother, wife and children were
named beneficiaries, and the settlor reserved no expressed
power to determine investments or to revoke the trust.
The Court, basing its opinion largely on the fact that the
trusts were to last for only a limited time, held that the
trust income was taxable to the grantor . 4
No case has as yet been before the Circuit Courts which
involved a short-term trust naming a member of the set-
tlor's family as beneficiary, a completely independent third
party as trustee, and which reserved no expressed control
in the grantor.3 14  The tone of the later decisions, particu-
larly the Price case, supra, indicates that the income from
Judge Soper, in dissenting from the majority opinion, pointed out that
with Section 22 (a) not considered, it could ,not be said that the income
from the corpus should be taxed to the settlor under Section 166. Since
the Supreme Court has indicated that Section 166 is to be narrowly con-
strued (Helvering v. Wood, supra, n. 7) it is submitted that this reasoning
was correct.
29 Commissioner v. Richter, 114 F. (2d) 452 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1940); Re-
manded, Helvering v. Richter, 312 U. S. 561 (1941).
80 Price v. Commissioner, 132 F. (2d) 95 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942). In reality,
the trust was to last from May 26, 1932 until January 1, 1938.81 Helvering v. Elias, 8upra, n. 16.
32 Price v. Commissioner, supra, n. 29. Emphasis was placed, however,
on the degree of control retained by the settlor coupled with the duration
of the trust.
3 Commissioner v. Barbour, 122 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), Cert.
den. 314 U. S. 691 (1941).
"Supra, n. 15.
8" The three cases which come closest to this point are the Ward case,
8upra, n. 26, the Price case, supra, n. 30, and the Barbour case, supra, n. 33.
In both the Ward and Price cases, a trust company was named trustee,
but in each case the settlor reserved broad powers of expressed control.
In the Barbour case, no expressed control was retained by the settlor, but
the trustee was the grantor's attorney who could not qualify as a "com-
pletely independent third party".
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such a trust would be taxed to its settlor. 4b It may well
be, however, that such income would be taxable to the
beneficiary, since it could not be said in such cases that
the settlor had not made a bona fide gift nor that the settlor
was none the poorer for the duration of the trust.
In dealing with short-term trusts which are not, strictly
speaking, "family trusts", the courts have reached a some-
what different result.85 In such cases, where the bene-
ficiary is some party other than a member of the settlor's
immediate family, decisions have generally held that it is
necessary for the grantor to retain some degree of ex-
pressed control over the corpus before he will be taxed
on the income therefrom. This result is natural, since
in these cases it cannot be said that because of the short
duration of the trust in question the settlor has in fact re-
tained control over the res.
In Helvering v. Bok,8 the settlor created a trust to last
for three years. Th6 beneficiaries named in the deed were
a charitable corporation and certain designated individuals
none of whom the settlor was under any obligation to sup-
port.. In holding the Clifford doctrine inapplicable the
Court said:
"The case for the Commissioner, as the Board in its
opinion points out, really comes down to the conten-
tion that the income of every short term trust shall be
taxed to the settlor of the trust. To hold the income
of this trust taxable to the settlor under the circum-
14b The Price case relied heavily on Commissioner v. Barbour, supra, n. 33
to reach Its result. If the two cases are combined, it could fairly be said
that the income from a trust naming an independent third party trustee
and which reserved no expressed control in the settlor would be taxable to
the settlor. This result is evident in the fact that in the Barbour case no
expressed control was reserved, while in the Price case an independent
bank was named trustee.
"The breakdown of short-term trusts into those instruments which are
primarily for the benefit of the settlor's family and those which are not,
has not been universally made. Hence it has been stated that the income
from all short-term trusts should not be taxed to the settlor. See Tyre,
Federal Taxation of Irrevocable Trusts (1940) 18 Tax Mag. 216, 222. The
author there points out that the Clifford doctrine should not be applicable
if the settlor has not reserved substantial control over the res. Since the
decisions Indicate, however, that the settlor retains control in fact due to
the short term of a family trust, the statement must be taken to envision
short-term trusts for the benefit of parties not members of the settlor's im-
mediate family.
88 Helvering v. Bok, 132 F. (2d) 365 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1942).
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stances present would go far beyond Helvering v., Clif-
ford, 1940, 309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed. 788,
and the cases which have followed it. In the absence
of legislation making such an extension we are not
justified in going that far. '8 7
In Commissioner v. Chamberlain," the settlor conveyed
certain property in trust naming as beneficiaries the trust-
ees of Columbia University. Although the trust was to
last for only four years, and although the settlor retained
broad powers of administrative control, the Second Circuit
held that the Clifford doctrine did not apply. 9 Previously,
the same court, by way of dictum, had indicated that there
was a valid distinction between a short-term trust naming
a member of the settlor's family as beneficiary, and one
of like duration which named an outsider as the cestui que
trust.
4 0
Apparently inconsistent with the theory advanced
above are the cases of Commissioner v. Lamont41 and
United States v. Anderson.2 In the first case, the Circuit
Court for the Second Circuit held that income from a trust
to last for one year was to be taxed to the settlor, even
although the beneficiaries were persons other than mem-
bers of the settlor's family. In the second decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the income
from a trust which was to last for six years should be taxed
to the settlor, irrespective of the fact that the beneficiary
was the First Baptist Church of Knoxville. On the one
hand, the Court felt that a trust lasting for only one year
reserved all economic benefit to the settlor,43 and on the
7 Supra, n. 36, 367.
38 Commissioner v. Chamberlain, 121 F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
ag Supra, n. 38, where the Court said at page 766:
"We think the substantial difference between this case and Hel-
vering v. Clifford, supra, where there was a family purpose trust
or Helvering v. Horst, supra, where there was a family purpose gift,
lies in the fact that here there is no such family flavor."
10 See Helvering v. Achelis, 112 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
11 Commissioner v. Lamont, 127 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
2 United States v. Anderson, 132 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
48 In the Lamont case the settlor retained broad powers to control the
corpus. This factor coupled with the fact that its term was for but one
year is strongly persuasive of the fact that the grantor still retained the




other, that the giving of income to a favorite religious or-
ganization would produce the same degree of personal sat-
isfaction as a like donation to a member of one's family.44
III
TRUSTS OF INTERMEDIATE DURATION
Closely akin to short-term trusts which name persons
other than the settlor's family as beneficiaries, are family
trusts which, for the purposes of this paper, have been
styled "trusts of intermediate duration".45 In such cases,
as in the case of short-term trusts which are not strictly
speaking "family trusts", the question of whether or not
the Clifford doctrine is applicable depends on the interplay
of the length of the trust with the degree of control re-
tained by the settlor. In cases involving trusts of interme-
diate duration, these factors are complementary, and usu-
ally the courts have applied the theory that the longer the
term the more important the expressed power of control
and vice versa. 6
In dealing with the factor of "expressed control" care
must be taken to distinguish between that type of control
over matters which are purely administrative, and that
type of control over matters which deal with the actual
disbursement of trust funds. Administrative control in-
cludes, among others, the power to direct investments, to
determine whether stock included in the trust corpus
should be bought or sold, to vote such stock, to manage the
properties constituting the corpus, and to d9 all acts neces-
sary for the administration of the trust. Control over dis-
bursements of trust funds, on the other hand, is that de-
gree of control vested in the grantor which enables him
"In the Anderson case, although the settlor retained substantial powers
of management, he had nevertheless parted with the corpus for six years.
Since the trust was not a "family trust", it is submitted that the Clifford
doctrine should not apply. See Tyre, op. cit. n. 35.
,5 These trusts have been styled above as those Instruments which will
last longer than strictly short-term trusts, but whose termination is not
dependent on the death of either the settlor, the beneficiary, or some party
in interest.
41 See Helvering v. Elias, 122 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), Cert. den.
314 U. S. 692 (1941).
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to dictate after the creation of the trust who are to consti-
tute the beneficiaries and how much income they are to
receive.
The Circuit Courts have held that the income from
trusts which were to last for 8 years and 8 months,47 and
10 years4 was taxable to the grantor, but at the same time
have held that income from trusts lasting 10 years,49 20
years,50 and 23 years"1 was not likewise taxable. In the
first of these decisions the term of the trust was coupled
with relatively broad powers of administrative control.
The Court felt that the combination of these two factors
was conclusive.
V ~52 CrIn both Cory v. Commissioner, and Commissioner v.
Jonas,53 the Court was asked to tax to a settlor income from
trusts which were to last for 10 years. It was found that
in the first case the settlor had retained wide powers of
administrative control, and therefore the settlor was held
taxable. 4 In the second case, the settlor retained no
power of control or management over the corpus and the
Court held that he was not taxable on the income there-
from.55 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
inferred in a related case that its facts were not as strong
as those found in the Clifford case but remanded the cause
for further proceedings because the issues had not been
47 Commissioner v. Berolzheimer, 116 F. (2d) 628 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
,8 Cory v. Commissioner, 126 F. (2d) 689 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1942), Cent. den.
63 S. Ct. 34 (U. S., 1942).
49 Commissioner v. Jonas, 122 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
50 Jones v. Norris, 122 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941).
52Hogle v. Commissioner, 132 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942).
11 Supra, n. 48.
53 Supra, n. 49.
1' In the Cory case, the reason for the Court's decision can be summed
up in the following quotation (p. 693):
"Finally we come to the taxpayer's control over the trusteed
property. Unlike the Clifford case the taxpayer here had no right
to change the distributive provisions of the trust or the beneficial
interests created thereby. Nevertheless, he could control the purse
strings through his power to change, modify or alter any of the
administrative provisions of the agreement. By this provision the
settlor subtly reserved complete dominion over the trustee, since the
trustee's appointment and powers are administrative."
51 It is worthy of note that in both the Cory case and the Jonas case,
the trustee was a third party, not a member of the settlor's immediate
family. This leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the degree of control
retained by the settlor was the factor that swung the scales in favor of
taxability in the first case and tax immunity in the second.
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framed with respect to Section 22(a) before the Board
of Tax Appeals. 6 In that case the trust was bound to last
for fifteen years, the settlor was one of four trustees, and
although the trustees were given broad powers of manage-
ment and control, no one of them acting alone could exer-
cise such powers.
In Jones v. Norris7 the settlor conveyed certain prop-
erty to one of his confidential employees in trust for his
children. The settlor reserved full power of control and
management over the trust estate. In holding that the
reservation of administrative control alone would not cause
the settlor to be taxed on the income from a family trust
which was to last for 20 years, the Court said:
"We do not understand that the power of manage-
ment, however unlimited, may operate to bring the
grantor within the sweeping provisions of Section
22(a), if by such powers he cannot derive any eco-
nomic benefit therefrom, except whatever advantages
he may gain by virtue of the provisions in the Revenue
Act, which permits the creation of trusts and imposes
taxation under Section 161 et seq."8
An interesting question was presented in Hogle v. Com-
missioner.9 There the settlor created a trust to last for
twenty-three years. The instrument named a third party
trustee and the settlor's children as beneficiaries. It set up
as trust res a trading account in stocks, bonds, and real
" Commissioner v. O'Keeffe, 118 F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941).
57 Supra, n. 50.
" Supra, n. 50, 11. In this connection, it is interesting to note that al-
though the settlor could not change any of the beneficiaries of the trust, he
could under certain conditions direct the amount of net income payable to
each. In this connection, the trust provided:
"I further reserve the right during my lifetime, to order and direct
my said Trustee to make settlement, either in full or in part, with
any one of my said beneficiaries, after such one shall have reached
the age of 21 years, or to order and direct that a certain part of the
net income from any one, or more, of said estates, to be determined
by me alone, shall be paid to the beneficiary thereof, .... "
Although it might have been possible for the Court to construe such a pro-
vision as control of disbursements, it either ignored this fact or its atten-
tion was not called thereto. In any event, the decision clearly indicates
that where such a power is retained solely for the protection of the bene-
ficiaries, the control In question is control over management within the
rule as stated above. But see Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2nd) 775
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
51 Supra, n. 51.
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estate which was to be managed and operated under the
direction of the taxpayer. Although the settlor thereby
retained broad powers of administrative control over the
res, there was no provision whereby he could share in
the corpus or the income of the trust. The trust corpus
was built up in two ways, namely, by the gain realized
by the settlor in trading in stocks, bonds and real estate on
behalf of the trust, and by the normal income received
from the sale or investment of property which was already
part of the trust corpus. The Court held that the income
realized from the trading on margin by the taxpayer on
behalf of the trust involved an exercise of his personal
skill and judgment, was in substance his personal earn-
ings, and was therefore taxable to him. The income de-
rived as interest or capital gains resulting from an out-
right sale of the corpus, however, was taxed to the trust
or the beneficiaries. 0 The Court also held that the same
theory applied to a somewhat similar trust, which was
to last for eighteen years, and which called for annual dis-
tributions to the beneficiaries. 61
The opinions in the Jones case and the Hogle case are
excellent illustrations of the effect of the retention by a
settlor of mere administrative control over the corpus in a
trust which is to last in the neighborhood of twenty years.
Both cases stand for the proposition that by retaining ad-
ministrative control alone, the taxpayer does not thereby
subject himself to income tax liability. That both de-
cisions reach the correct result is made clear when it is
realized that in neither case did the settlor retain any
economic benefit from the corpus, and therefore the true
test of taxability to a grantor was absent.
80 This phase of the case drew a strong dissent from Judge Bratton in
which he said (p. 77) :
"By each of these trust instruments, petitioner gave to the trust
estate the right to receive and enjoy the economic gain realized from
his time and efforts devoted to its management. All of the taxable
income of each trust should be taxed to the estate or the benefi-
ciaries. None of it should be taxed against petitioner, except the
income which accrued to the individual share of George H. Hogle in
the Three Trust during his minority."
61 Supra, n. 51, 72-74.
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It is sometimes the case that a settlor will create a
trust which has no definite termination date, but at the
same time is not a trust of unlimited duration. Examples
of such instruments are trusts established for the main-
tenance and support of the settlor's minor children, 2 trusts
which can be terminated by the trustee,63 or trusts which
will terminate upon fulfillment of all conditions named
therein.64 Where a settlor has created a trust for the sup-
port of his minor children and reserved therein broad
powers of administrative control, the courts generally hold
that the income is taxable to him.65 Such decisions are
justified on the ground that by analyzing the interplay
of control on duration the court can clearly see that the
settlor has retained the economic benefits from the corpus.66
In Richardson v. Commissioner6 7 a situation arose in
which the Clifford doctrine was used to tax the income
of a trust to the trustee. The corpus involved in that
case consisted of a certain property which had recently
been given to the settlor by the trustee. After the crea-
tion of the trust, the trustee was given the power to ter-
minate the instrument at any time, and upon such termina-
tion the corpus was to go to him. In such a situation, the
Whiteley v. Commissioner, 120 F. (2d) 782 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941). Here
the trust was irrevocable and provided for payment of the income to the
donor when he should so demand during the minority of his children, said
income to be used entirely for their support, maintenance, education and
enjoyment. After the beneficiary attained the age of twenty-one, she was
entitled to receive income and corpus "in such amounts and at such times
as the Donor in writing orders such distribution or distributions to be
made."
61Richardson v. Commissioner, 121 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), Cert.
den. 314 U. S. 684 (1941).
,Jacobs v. Commissioner, 129 F. (2d) 99 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
"The Supreme Court has held that where a trust is established in dis-
charge of the settlor's parental obligation to support his minor children,
the income therefrom will be taxable to him. See Helvering v. Stokes, 296
U. S. 551 (1935) ; Helvering v. Coxey, 297 U. S. 694 (1936). And see Hel-
vering v. Stuart, 63 S. Ct. 140 (1942), which held that in such cases the
possibility of the use of income to relieve the grantor, pro tanto, of his
parental obligation is sufficient to bring the entire income of such trusts
within the rule of attribution laid down in Douglas v. Willcuts.
"' In the Whiteley case the Court, in emphasizing the control retained by
the settlor, said, 120 F. (2d) 785:
"In this case the settlor of these trusts by its terms could have
received its income and applied it to the support of his minor chil-
dren. He did not choose to do so, but left it to accumulate for them.
He controlled the use of the money and had the same non-material
satisfaction as that of the taxpayer in the Horst case."
67 Supra, n. 63.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Court had no trouble in applying the rule in the Clifford
case, since all the economic benefits of the corpus re-
mained at the command of the trustee.
IV
TRUSTS FOR LIFE
Where a trust is to last for the life of a party in interest,
the question of whether or not the Clifford doctrine can
apply usually depends on the degree of control the settlor
has retained over the corpus."5 In such cases, the distinc-
tion drawn above between purely administrative control
and control over disbursements bulks large in importance.
As a general rule it may be stated that if a trust is to last
for the life of a party in interest and if the settlor retains
merely administrative control over the corpus, income from
the trust will not be taxable to the grantor. On the other
hand, if the settlor in a similar trust reserves that degree
of control over disbursements which would enable him to
determine what portions of income will be paid to what
beneficiaries, the Clifford doctrine will apply. 9 The rea-
son for the rule is that in the first case the settlor has
not retained the economic benefits from the corpus, while
in the second case he still remains the substantial owner
of the res even after his conveyance in trust.
In dealing with trusts which are to last for the life
of an interested party, the Court should consider both Sec-
tions 166 and 167, and Section 22(a), thereby construing
08 In dealing with instruments which are to last for the life of a party
in interest it is necessary to adopt a realistic approach to the problem. It
could not be said, for example, that a trust would come within this classi-
fication if its duration were dependent on the death of a beneficiary who
was, at the date of its creation, ninety-five years old. In such cases the
court should look through the form to the substance of the transaction,
and find that the trust was, in reality, one of the short-term class. The
author makes no attempt to draw the line in such unusual cases, but leaves
this question to future judicial decisions.
69 Interrelated with these two types of control is the nature of the corpus
over which said control Is retained. The distinction drawn above is clear
where the corpus consists of stable investments, or securities in a large
corporation. If the corpus Is represented by stock in a wholly owned
family corporation, however, absolute power of management by the settlor
might in substance amount to control over actual disbursements. In such




their interplay upon one another. 0 In one case71 the Court
was able to show that by virtue of retaining wide powers
over disbursements, the settlor remained taxable on the
trust income, even though the terms of the trust stated
that it was to last for the life of the settlor.7 1 In reaching
its decision, the Court relied on both Sections 166 and
22(a) .7 In another case,74 the Court indicated that al-
though it was likely that the income of the trust was tax-
able to the settlor under Sec. 166, it would place its decision
on Section 22 (a) as construed by Helvering v. Clifford, in-
asmuch as it was clear that the Clifford doctrine was ap-
plicable and because the Court had refused to tax the
settlor under Sections 219(g) and (h) when the trust had
been before it on a previous occasion.75
An excellent case which demonstrates the fact that the
retention of control over disbursements will be fatal to
the settlor is Commissioner v. Buck. 6 In that case, the
7o Helvering v. Stuart, 63 S. Ct. 140 (1942). See Kraft v. Commissioner,
111 F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1940), Cert. den. 311 U. S. 671 (1940), where
the court stated that certain trusts were within the literal provisions of
Section 166 of the Revenue Act of 1934, but that the case might have been
decided on the authority of the Clifford case. And see Welch v. Bradley,
130 F. (2d) 109 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942), Cert. den. 63 S. Ct. 257 (1942).
71 Cox v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940), Cert. den.
311 U. S. 667 (1940).
7For a somewhat similar decision see the late case of Downie v. Com-
missioner, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 6th, 1943). There the taxpayer created
a trust which provided that the income should be collected until his death,
at which time complete distribution would be made to the settlor's brother
and sister. The instrument provided that should the settlor become dis-
abled, both the principal and the income of the trust could be used for his
support. Subject to the consent of one beneficiary, the settlor could
revoke the trust, change the beneficiaries, or change their respective shares.
The Court stated that the Clifford doctrine was clearly applicable and also
that the trust income could be taxed to the settlor under See. 167.
73 In this case the Court relied heavily on the fact that the two trustees
of whom the grantor was one had the power in their discretion to control
the amounts to be paid to the beneficiaries. Since the instrument stated
that in all matters of discretion, the grantor's will should control, the Court
stated that donor's powers were substantially equivalent to those of abso-
lute owner of the corpus.
71 White v. Higgins, 116 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
75 Sections 219(g) and (h) were the predecessors, in the Revenue Acts of
1924 and 1926, of Sections 166 and 167.
The Court indicated that its former ruling based on Sec. 166 was of
shrunken importance, since after the instant case has been previously
before it (Higgins v. White, 93 F. (2d) 357 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937)) that sec-
tion had been amended to make grantors taxable not only where the power
to revest is in the grantor as such, either alone or in conjunction with any
person not having a substantial adverse interest, but also where such power
is vested in any person not having a substantial adverse interest.
76 Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941).
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taxpayer created a trust naming a bank as trustee and his
wife and children as beneficiaries. The trust was to last
during the life of settlor's wife, and for a period thereafter
at which time the corpus was to be paid to the children.
Coupled with broad administrative power, the settlor re-
tained the power to alter or amend in any respect those
trust provisions which related to the distribution of income
or principal. However, this power could not be exercised
in such a way that the trust could be revoked, or the corpus
could revert to the settlor. In holding the Clifford doctrine
applicable, the Court said:
"During his life, he has entire control of the sale
and investment of the corpus, in whole or in part, and
the voting power of any stock now or later constitut-
ing that corpus. When to such control there is coupled
the power, until his death, freely to sprinkle the in-
come about among any beneficiaries he may select
(as if he were playing a hose), it is impossible to
conclude, in the light of the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court, that the income is not taxable to
him.,,77
After indicating that retention of control over disburse-
ments was a sufficient indication of ownership as to justify
taxing the income from a trust to its settlor,78 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Clifford doctrine to
a trust which was to last for the life of the grantor and
which named the settlor's retired servant and a friend as
beneficiaries. 79 That the settlor retained the power to con-
trol disbursements of the trust income was a decisive
factor in making him liable for the tax.8" The same result
was reached in a similar case by the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit."
'7 Supra, n. 76, 777.
,1 Commissioner v. Brown, 122 F. (2d) 800 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1942).
71 Brown v. Commissioner, 131 F. (2d) 640 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1942), Cert.
den. - S. Ct. - (U. S., 1943).
80 In the Brown case, the Court stated 131 F. (2d) 641:
"We think that a settlor who is a person of means and who can
control the spending of a fund, which she has set up, in every re-
spect except spending it for herself is sufficiently the 'owner' of the
fund to make its income taxable to her under 22(a)."
warren v. Commissioner, 133 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
[VOL. VII220
CLIFFORD DOCTRINE
Apparently in harmony with the general rule is Wil-
liamson v. Commissioner."2 There the settlor created a
trust which named the taxpayer, his wife, and their at-
torney as trustees, any two of which were given full power
and authority to exercise all the powers of the trustees
under the indenture. The trustees were directed to ad-
minister the trust property for the benefit of the settlor's
wife and daughter as long as either were living, and were
authorized "in their uncontrolled discretion" to apply the
net income and so much of the corpus as they deemed
necessary for the maintenance and welfare of the bene-
ficiaries. The taxpayer retained the power to remove the
other two trustees and appoint their successors, the power
to vote the trusteed stock, the power to direct sales of
trust property without limitation, and the power to pre-
clude sales and investments by the trustees except upon
his approval. On these facts, the Board of Tax Appeals
held that the settlor was taxable under Section 22 (a), and
this decision was affirmed on appeal.
In the Williamson3 case it is clear that the Court was
called upon to apply the Clifford doctrine to a trust to
last for the life of an interested party, and which reserved
broad powers of administrative control in the settlor. The
Court was also able to see, however, that the settlor in
conjunction with his attorney could control the amount of
trust income distributable to the beneficiaries. 4 This being
true, the Court held that the taxpayer was liable under
Section 167 as well as Section 22 (a), and thereby relied
on both sections of the Internal Revenue Code to sustain
taxability.5
Family trusts are often created which are to last for
the life of a party in interest, and which reserve broad
12 Williamson v. Commissioner, 132 F. (2d) 489 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
11 5upr, n. 82.
, Clearly, therefore, the settlor retained control over distribution.
8 The Court stated that any two of the three trustees were given full
power to exercise all the power of the trustees under the trust instrument.
Thus, the Court reasoned, the taxpayer and his lawyer were given an un-
controlled discretion to apply all of the net income they deemed sufficient
for the support of the settlor's child. Since the settlor in his uncontrolled
discretion could have distributed all of the income to the child, the Court
held Section 167 applicable.
19431
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powers of administrative control with the grantor, but
which do not reserve in the grantor control over the dis-
position of the income. In such cases, the trustee may
be the settlor himself, or a third party who is directed to
follow the advice of the grantor in such matters. In
either event, the Clifford doctrine will not be applied, inas-
much as the settlor has parted with that degree of economic
benefit that makes the income of the trust which he has
created taxable to him.
Commissioner v. Branch86 illustrates the application
of the general rule. There the taxpayer created an irre-
vocable trust naming himself and two other parties as
trustees, and naming his wife as life beneficiary with pro-
visions for distribution of the corpus upon termination.
The trust provided that as long as the settlor continued
to act as trustee he alone should have full power to direct
investments and otherwise manage the res. In refusing
to tax the income of the trust to the settlor the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said:
"Helvering v. Clifford rests on its particular facts,
as the court was careful to say. We do not under-
stand that the case, as a general proposition, obliterates
the separate legal personality of the wife for purposes
of determining the gross income of the husband under
Section 22(a). Where the grantor has stripped him-
self of all command over the income for an indefinite
period, and in all probability, under the terms of the
trust instrument, will never regain beneficial owner-
ship of the corpus, there seems to be no statutory basis
for treating the income as that of the grantor under
Section 22(a) merely because he has made himself
trustee with broad power in that capacity to manage
the trust estate. ' '87
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit used the
Branch case as sole authority when it refused to apply the
Clifford doctrine to a trust which named the settlor and
wife as trustees and the settlor's wife as life beneficiary;
"Commissioner v. Branch, 114 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
117Supra, n. 86, 987.
[VOL. VII
1943] CLIFFORD DOCTRINE
and which in substance gave the grantor power to admin-
ister the trust in his uncontrolled discretion.88  A similar
conclusion was reached in Commissioner v. Armour89
where an irrevocable trust named the settlor as trustee,
the settlor's daughter as life beneficiary, and gave the
settlor trustee the broad power to manage, control, sell,
lease, invest and reinvest the trust res9 °
Two cases which illustrate the extreme to which the
Government has .attempted to carry the Clifford doctrine
are Commissioner v. Betts91 and Suhr v. Commissioner.2
In both cases the taxpayer created irrevocable trusts nam-
ing third parties as trustees and stating that the indentures
were to last for the life of the beneficiary, with appropriate
remainders over.9 3 In each case the settlor retained ex-
pressed powers of control over investment, sale, and man-
agement of the trust corpus, but in neither case did these
reservations make the rule in the Clifford case applicable. 4
In a somewhat similar case,95 the Circuit Court for the
First Circuit refused to apply the Clifford doctrine where
an irrevocable trust was created to last for the duration
8 Helvering v. Palmer, 115 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
Commissioner v. Armour, 125 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
90 In Kent v. Rothensies, 35 F. Supp. 291 (D. C., E. D. Pa., 1940) (re-
versed on other grounds 120 F. (2d) 476) the taxpayer created a trust
to last for the life of the beneficiary. The instrument named the settlor as
one of two trustees, the said trustees being given unusual powers to deal
with the trust property in connection with the grantor's business. The
Court refused to tax the settlor on the income of the trust under Sec. 22(a)
and distinguished the Clifford case on the grounds that there a short-term
trust was in issue while here the trust was not to terminate until the death
of the beneficiary. Cf. Schoellkopf v. McGowan, 43 F. Supp. 568 (D. C.,
W. D. N. Y., 1942).
91 Commissioner v. Betts, 123 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
"Suhr v. Commissioner, 126 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
"In Commissioner v. Donahue, 128 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), the
government contended that the Clifford case applied where the term of
the trust was for the life of certain beneficiaries, none of whom were mem-
bers of the taxpayer's household. The settlor had named a corporate trus-
tee, but had stipulated that the trustee should accept such directions con-
cerning the management of the trust re8 as the grantor should give in
writing. The Clifford case was distinguished by the Board of Tax Appeals
(44 B. T. A. 329) and this decision was affirmed.
01 See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Biggs in Commissioner v.
Park, 113 F. (2(1) 352, 354 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1940), in which it was stated that
the Clifford case should apply to preclude a taxpayer from taking as a
deduction from gross Income interest on a demand note given by the tax-
payer to his wife.
Is Commissioner v. Bateman, 127 F. (2d) 266 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942).
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of the settlor's life with all powers of management and
control vested in the trustee. However, in refusing to tax
the settlor, the Court experienced some difficulty in apply-
ing the Clifford doctrine to the facts as presented. 6
V
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Since the decision in Helvering v. Clifford there have
been relatively few cases before the Supreme Court deal-
ing with the taxability to a grantor of income derived from
irrevocable family trusts. The Court has held, however,
that such income cannot be properly taxed to the settlor
under Section 166, even though the trust in question was
to last but for a short span of years, and reserved broad
powers of management and control in the grantor.97 More-
over, after rendering its opinions in Helvering v. Horst 8
and Helvering v. Eubank,99 the Court had no trouble in
taxing the income of a testamentary trust to its cestui
que trust,100 although the facts showed that the taxpayer
had irrevocably assigned a part of said income to her
children for one year.101
In Hormel v. Helverng'012 the Supreme Court affirmed
a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals10 3 which taxed
to the settlor income from a trust to last for three years,
which named as beneficiaries the taxpayer and his wife
as guardian for their children, and which named the
grantor and another as co-trustees. The Court recognized,
however, that the taxpayer had not been given an oppor-
tunity to offer evidence before the Board of Tax Appeals
96 In the Bateman case the Court said 127 F. (2d) 271:
"Frankly we do not know how the Supreme Court would apply the
general criteria of the Clifford case to the facts now before us. We
have to make our decision with such light as is available to us."
17 Helvering v. Wood, 309 U. S. 344 (1940).
91 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940).
09 Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940).
100 Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941), reversing Schaffner v.
Harrison, 113 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
101 For a full discussion of the Horst and Eubank cases and their inter-
play on Section 22(a) see Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Section
22(a) (1940) 51 Yale L. J. 213, 239-248.
102 Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941).1 03Helvering v. Hormel, 111 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
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on the question of the applicability of Section 22 (a), and
that a remote chance might exist to take the case out of the
Clifford rule. The case was remanded, therefore, with
direction to the Board to allow the grantor an opportunity
to present any additional facts which would serve this
purpose.
Closely akin to the Hormel case, supra, is Helvering v.
Richter,"°4 in which the Court followed its previous de-
cision by remanding the cause to the Board of Tax Appeals
for further proceedings in the light of the Clifford case.
It is worthy to note, however, that in the Schaffner,10 5
Hormel, °0 and Richter 17 cases, the Court indicated that
short-term family assignments, whether they be in trust
or otherwise, would not defeat the tax liability of the
assignor, irrespective of the fact that the assignor retained
104 Helvering v. Richter, 312 U. S. 561 (1941). The Richter and Hormel
cases laid to rest one -procedural problem involved in the application of the
Clifford doctrine, namely whether Section 22(a) could be relied upon for
the first time on appeal to the Circuit Courts. There remains unanswered
by the Supreme Court, however, the perplexing question of whether or not
the ownership of trust income is a question of law or fact. The importance
of this point lies in the fact that if the Court of Appeals adopts the view
that ownership is a question of fact, it will not reverse the lower court
even though it believes the government has failed to make its case come
within the Clifford doctrine and vice versa. The converse of this is, of
course, true, if the court adopts the view that the question of ownership
of the income is a question of law.
The Circuit Courts have applied opposite theories with regard to this
point. Both White v. Higgins, 116 F. (2d) 312, 321 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940)
and Commissioner v. Wilson, 125 F. (2d) 307, 309 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942)
hold that the ultimate question of ownership is one of law and open for
determination on appeal. But In Commissioner v. Goulder, 123 F. (2d)
686, 689 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) the Court stated that the Clifford case seemed
to hold that whether or not initial facts have the legal effect of proving
ownership of Income is a question of fact, and that as a result the Appel-
late Court lacked "the power to decide the facts upon appeal, no matter
how clearly the record may disclose them". In Commission v. Armour,
125 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942) the Court said (p. 471) :
"The Board, with the Clifford case in mind, found here that the
settlor did not reserve the economic enjoyment of the income of this
trust estate and, just as the Supreme Court felt in the Clifford
case, so we feel here that the Board having found as an ultimate
fact that the settlor did not retain the economic enjoyment to such
an extent as to render her subject to the tax upon the income, we
should not, indeed may not, disturb the finding."
It is submitted that the ultimate question of ownership of income is
either a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact, and in either
event should be subject to review on appeal.105 Supra, n. 100.
o10 Supra, n. 102.07Supra, n. 104.
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little if any expressed control over the property thus con-
veyed. 08
The most recent and far reaching construction by the
Supreme Court of the rule in the Clifford case is Helvering
v. Stuart.'0 ° In that case two separate trusts were created
by John Stuart and R. Douglas Stuart of stock of a
corporation of which they were respectively president and
vice-president. In the John Stuart trust the life benefi-
ciaries were the settlor's adult children, and the trustees
were the grantor, his wife, and R. Douglas Stuart. In the
R. Douglas Stuart trust the beneficiaries were the minor
children of the settlor, the trustees were the settlor, his
wife and John Stuart, and the trust was to continue until
the youngest beneficiary reached the age of thirty.
Both trusts provided that the settlor should retain ab-
solute control over the management of the corpus,"' and
that during the settlor's life the remaining trustees should
have the power to alter the indenture in any way."' Be-
"o' These cases are not absolute holdings on this point. However, the
broad sweep of the language contained therein points with almost certainty
to the conclusion that unless the taxpayer could show strong facts to the
contrary, the income from the strictly short-term family trusts would be
taxable to him. Such decisions are very closely akin to the doctrine of
Lucas v. Earl, 281 .U. S. 111 (1931). That case, and the decisions which
have extended its scope, proceed upon the theory that "no distinction can
be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the
fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew." In
the short-term family trust arrangement, not only the Income but also the
income producing property is conveyed for a short period of time. How-
ever, the substantive effect of a purely short term assignment in trust (for
example, a trust to last for one year) Is In reality the assignment of an
item of income. See MAGiLL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES (1943) Ch. 2,
49-57.1 0 0 1Helvering v. Stuart, 63 S. Ct. 140 (U. S., 1942).
110 In this connection the instrument provided:
"Eighth. The Donor reserves and shall have the right at any
time and from time to time to direct the Trustees to sell the whole
of the Trust Fund, or any part thereof, and to reinvest the proceeds
in such other property as the Donor shall direct. The Donor further
reserves and shall have the right at any time and from time to time
to withdraw and take over to himself the whole or any part of the
Trust Fund upon first transferring and delivering to the Trustees
other property satisfactory to them of a market value at least equal
to that of the property so withdrawn."
" In this connection the instrument provided:
"Ninth. During the life of the Donor, the said [wife and brother
of the donor], or the survivor of them, shall have full power and au-
thority, by an Instrument in writing signed and delivered by them
or by the survivor of them to the Trustees, to alter, change or amend
this Indenture at any time and from time to time by changing the
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cause the Circuit Court of Appeals had found that under
the law of Illinois the wife and brother as trustees had
no authority to revest the property in the grantor, the
Supreme Court held that Sections 166 and 167 were in-
applicable.
The Government contended, however, that although
Sections 166 and 167 did not apply, Section 22(a) was
applicable and the income from the trusts should be taxed
to the settlors. The Court stated that irrespective of the
broad power of administrative control reserved by the
settlor in the John Stuart trust, the facts on the present
record did not justify taxing him under the Clifford doc-
trine because:
"Economic gain realized or realizable by the taxpayer
is necessary to produce taxable income under our stat-
utory scheme."112
The Court stated, however, that when the case had been
before the Board of Tax Appeals it had not been necessary
for the Board to reach a conclusion based on Section 22 (a).
Thus there was no definite finding in the record as to
the character of control reserved by the settlor. The case
was therefore remanded for a determination of such
facts.113
The importance of the Stuart case is readily demon-
strated when it is realized that its facts presented an ex-
cellent opportunity for the extension of the Clifford doc-
trine by the Supreme Court. Under the Stuart decision,
however, the Court impliedly recognized the rule that
the retention by the grantor of only broad administrative
control over the corpus would not make the income of a
long-term family trust taxable to him. The Court adopted,
beneficiary hereunder, or by changing the time when the Trust Fund,
or any part thereof, or the income, is to be distributed, or by
changing the Trustees, or in any other respect."
212 Supra, n. 109, 148.
... In the R. Douglas Stuart trusts the court held that entire income was
taxable to the settlor under Section 167, because, 8upra, n. 109, 149:
"We are dealing with a trust for minors where the trustees, with-
out any interest adverse to the grantor, have authority to devote so
much of the net income as 'to them shall seem advisable' to the 'edu-
cation, support and maintenance' of the minor."
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therefore, the sound underlying theory of the previous
decisions handed down by the various Circuit Courts of
Appeals which had dealt with similar trusts."4
VI
CONCLUSION
1. Although represented as being a monster by some,
the rule in the Clifford case is, in reality, a useful plug
in one of the last methods of tax avoidance which utilized
the trust device. Where a taxpayer seeks to reduce his
surtaxes by channelling a part of his earnings by means
of a short-term family trust to members of his immediate
family, his scheme is doomed to failure. On the other
hand, if a settlor creates a trust intending thereby actually
to give the corpus or its benefits to a member of his
family and not merely to part therewith for a short period
of time, he will not remain taxable on the income.11 5 The
ultimate test is, therefore, that irrespective of his convey-
ance in trust, if the taxpayer has retained the economic
benefits of the res, he will remain taxable on its income.
2. While it is dangerous dogmatically to classify cases
involving the Clifford doctrine, it is possible, in the light
of the abundant authority on the subject represented by
the decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, to state three
general rules with respect thereto.
It may be stated as an initial proposition that where
the Court is dealing with a strictly short-term family trust,
(lasting for six years or less) it will generally tax the
income therefrom to the settlor irrespective of the absence
of expressed control over the corpus retained by the set-
tlor. In such cases, it is felt that the implied control
reserved by the settlor by reason of the fact that the trust
11 The Stuart case received a careful examination in Williamson v.
Commissioner, supra, n. 82. The Court there points out that the Stuart
decision stands for the fact that although a trust is of long duration or
that the trustees are persons other than the donor, the Clifford doctrine
will yet apply. The important factor, in such cases, is the type of control
reserved by-the settlor.
115 It is clear that where a settlor has created a trust but retains the
power to change the beneficiaries at will, he has made no completed gift
within the intendments of the Gift Tax Law. Estate of Sanford v. Com-
missioner, 308 U. S. 39 (1939).
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is to last but a few years, and the ordinary control exer-
cised by the settlor over the members of his family, make
the result conclusive.
Where a trust is to last longer than a strictly short-
term instrument, but termination of it is not dependent
upon the life of an interested party, a different rule is
applicable. In such cases, duration and control are comple-
mentary, the courts usually applying the theory that the
longer the term, the more important the factor of control
and vice versa. It is also important in dealing with such
cases to clearly distinguish between control over man-
agement and control over actual disbursements. If the
type of control is of the latter character, the settlor has,
for all practical purposes, retained the economic benefits
of the corpus, and will therefore remain taxable on its
income.
If the term of a trust is measured by the life of an
interested party, the settlor will not be taxable on its in-
come, irrespective of the fact that he has retained broad
powers of administrative control. Where, however, the
settlor still retains the power to alter the beneficiaries and
direct the amounts payable to each, the decisions indicate
that he is taxable on the income from the trust.
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